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Abstract
Due to the frequency with which smartphone owners use their devices, effortful
authentication methods such as passwords and PINs are not an effective choice for
smartphone authentication. Past research has offered solutions such as graphical
passwords, biometrics and password hardening techniques. However, these solutions
still require the user to authenticate frequently, which may become increasingly
frustrating over time. Transparent authentication has been suggested as an alternative
to such effortful solutions. It utilizes readily available behavioral biometrics to provide a
method that runs in the background without requiring explicit user interaction. In this
manner, transparent authentication delivers a less effortful solution with which the
owner does not need to engage as frequently. We expand the current research into
transparent authentication by surveying the user, an important stakeholder, regarding
their opinions towards transparent authentication on a smartphone. We asked 30
participants to complete a series of tasks on a smartphone that was ostensibly
protected with varying degrees of transparent authentication. We then surveyed
participants regarding their opinions of transparent authentication, their opinions of
the sensitivity of tasks and data on smartphones, and their perception of the level of
protection provided to the data and apps on the device. We found that 90% of those
surveyed would consider using transparent authentication on their mobile device
should it become available. Furthermore, participants had widely varying opinions of
the sensitivity of the experiment’s tasks, showing that a more granular method of
smartphone security is justified. Interestingly, we found that the complete removal of
security barriers, which is commonly cited as a goal in authentication research, does
not align with the opinions of our participants. Instead, we found that having a few
barriers to device and data access aided the user in building a mental model of the
on-device security provided by transparent authentication. These results provide a
valuable understanding to inform development of transparent authentication on
smartphones since they provide a glimpse into the needs and wants of the end user.
Keywords: Usability; Usable security; Authentication; Transparent; Mobile
Introduction
The popularity of mobile devices is undeniable. According to the International Data
Corporation (IDC), more smartphones were sold in 2012 than desktop and laptop
computers combined [1]. Their popularity may be attributed in part to their increas-
ing functionality – technological advances in computing have allowed smartphones to
become increasingly powerful, which in turn supports greater functionality. Smartphones
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offer a wide range of capabilities, such as email account access, news updates, access to
the Internet and device location via GPS. As a result of their increased (and increasing)
functionality, smartphones are able to access and store personally identifying informa-
tion. Potentially private data such as medical details, sensitive business information,
personal pictures and voicemails have been recovered from mobile devices, despite
being deleted [2]. This confirms that users do indeed store these kinds of data on their
devices.
The sensitivity and amount of information stored on smartphones underscores the
need for an effective, flexible method of managing device access. Historically, passwords
(including sketched varieties) and PINs have been used to protect smartphones from
unauthorized access, but they are easily cracked or weakened through sharing, reuse or
using weak secrets [3,4]. The cumbersome nature and unpopularity of repeatedly typing a
password on amobile device has led users to avoid accessing business data on their mobile
devices [5]. Furthermore, such secret knowledge techniques provide point-of-entry secu-
rity: once the secret has been entered, the user has access to all on-device services and
data.
A better method for providing mobile device security would be to use the data-rich
interactions a user has with their device to create a pattern which acts as a baseline to
support comparison with users in order to verify that the current user is the owner. Such
authentication, which may be based on behavioral biometrics such as keystroke dynam-
ics and speaker verification, allow for transparent, continuous authentication that runs
in the background as the user goes about using their device as usual. With transpar-
ent authentication, the user is no longer required to explicitly authenticate because the
uniqueness in their device interactions provides the basis for authentication decisions.
The biometric information may be gathered via the rich set of input sensors that charac-
terize modernmobile devices, such asmicrophones, keyboards, screen-based touch input
and gyroscopes. These multimedia-based sensors have the benefit of familiarity to the
user since they are already used for a variety of on-device functions. The rich and poten-
tially seamless nature of sensor-based biometric data provides transparent authentication
with the possibility of providing a more granular approach to application and data access
by thresholding tasks. This scheme implies that the device maintains an ongoing level of
confidence that the current user is also its owner, referred to as device confidence. It is
continuously updated based on biometric matches and non-matches. If device confidence
is above a defined certainty level, called task confidence, then the task (or data access) is
allowed; otherwise it is denied.
Transparent authentication has the following benefits over traditional methods:
Effortless: Since the behavioral biometrics are gathered in the background during
regular device use, the user does not need to interrupt their tasks to authenticate.
Fine-grained access control: Traditional authentication mechanisms allows for point-
of-entry authentication; once the user has provided the correct shared secret, all data and
functionality on the device is accessible. Transparent authentication has the capability of
providing access control on a per-task or per-data basis.
Continuous: The utilized behavioral biometrics may be selected to take advantage of the
most frequently performed tasks such as typing or speaking. In this way, there is a rich
source of information used to authenticate, which supports a continuous authentication
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model. More information about transparent authentication on mobile devices can be
gained from these publications [6,7].
Transparent authentication may elicit concerns regarding privacy, among others, that
could lead users to reject it due to its utilization of behavioral biometrics [8]. In order for
transparent authentication to gain support, users will have to accept it and consent to have
themechanism installed on their device, potentially barring their legitimate access to their
own applications and services. The user is an important stakeholder in the implemen-
tation of transparent authentication; thus, their opinions and needs must be considered
early in the design process to encourage acceptance. In this paper, we present the find-
ings of a study carried out to determine whether transparent, continuous authentication
is likely to be accepted by users. Finally, we elicit initial impressions regarding the use
of transparent authentication on a mobile device as an alternative to traditional access
control.
Study goals
Alternative authentication methods have been widely researched over the last decade
[9-12], but rarely deployed outside a lab setting. In general, researchers might not fully
understand how or if users will use, bypass or accept new security mechanisms. Feasi-
bility studies demonstrate that behavioral biometrics show potential as the basis for the
decision–making in a transparent authentication system [13,14]. The outstanding ques-
tion is whether mobile device users would choose to use such a method to protect their
devices and data.
Our study has two purposes: (1) to determine whether the participants feel a trans-
parent authentication method on a mobile device provides adequate security, and, if so,
whether they would consider using it on their own mobile devices; (2) to elicit user opin-
ions and suggestions to inform the design of a mobile device transparent authentication
mechanism. Our study was designed to answer the following related research questions:
• What are the participant’s opinions of, and reactions to, using a transparent
authentication method on a mobile device?
• What is the participant’s perceived level of security while using a mobile device that
employs transparent authentication?
• How do participants react to barriers blocking them from completing their intended
tasks?
These questions are intended to examine user opinions of a possible transparent authen-
tication mechanism, and not the security provision of such a mechanism. The security
provision can be carried out once a prototype system has been made available.
Background and literature review
Smartphone authentication
Mobile devices are rapidly changing the landscape for interactive computing. The tech-
nology provided by Google Android, Apple iOS, Blackberry, and Microsoft Windows
Phone has enabled smartphones and tablets to become the computing device of choice
for mobile workers. The success of these devices, and the applications that run on them,
is largely due to the multitude of sensors embedded in them. These sensors, such as
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the microphone, camera, gyroscope and accelerometer, not only provide information
to applications but the sensed information can also be leveraged to facilitate continu-
ous authentication by taking advantage of the unique patterns that exist in the user’s
interaction with the device.
Despite the range of interactions available due to mobile device sensors, passwords
and PINs remain commonplace authentication methods due to their familiarity, ease of
use and the existence of code libraries, widgets and development toolkits that support
them as authenticators. The availability of development tools that support password use
is bolstered by corporate policies that mandate password use on mobile devices that
store or access corporate information, despite studies that have shown that these poli-
cies can produce passwords that are less secure than expected [15]. Such policies often
dictate the length and required characters in a password, but do not allow for alternative
authentication methods. Interestingly, corporate password policies have been shown to
negatively impact employee productivity due to their strict, inflexible nature [16]. Identi-
fying the issues and limitations of passwords with respect to mobile devices may provide
information for corporations, enabling updates to their corporate policies to include
authentication alternatives.
While passwords and PINsmay be a commonly usedmeans of authentication onmobile
devices due to their simplicity and familiarity, studies have shown that they are often
slow and cumbersome to type on a soft keyboard [17,18]. Add to this the commonality
of mistakes when typing on a mobile device keyboard [19,20] and it becomes clear that
passwords and PINs are not themost effectivemeans of authentication formobile devices.
Bao et al. performed a user study into the use of passwords as an authenticator on mobile
devices, and found that users find passwords on mobiles so cumbersome and slow that
they avoided accessing data on their devices unless necessary [5].
Passwords and PINs have the benefit of being familiar to users, as well as being easy
to use and implement, even in legacy systems. In order to retain these benefits, research
has been performed to attempt to strengthen passwords and PINs rather than replac-
ing them. Vibrapass uses haptic interaction with a separate mobile device to improve the
secrecy of entering a password or PIN into an easily observed public terminal, such as
an ATM [21]. The mobile device, which is linked to the terminal during the interaction,
vibrates to indicate that the user should enter an incorrect secret (i.e., an incorrect charac-
ter in a password or PIN), while lack of vibration indicates that a correct entry is expected.
Their study showed that the system was acceptable to users with about half the char-
acters as incorrect secrets, while providing a higher security level. Such a system could
easily be used for password and PIN entry on a mobile device, as was studied by Bianchi
et al. in creating the Phone Lock method [22]. Phone Lock takes advantage of smartphone
sensors to add non-visual audio and haptic cues, such as spoken numbers audible via
earphones and vibrations linked to numbers, to PINs of various lengths. Their goal is to
provide a PIN entry mechanism that is resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks, but retains
the familiarity and ease-of-use attributed to PINs. Their results showed that the users
were significantly faster entering the PIN via audio rather than vibration cues, and that
the error rate remained insignificantly different between the two modalities [22]. These
methods provide valuable insight into how passwords and PINs may be strengthened
by using sensor information, but are not necessarily useful for transparent authentica-
tion. It may be argued that these methods are more invasive than simple passwords or
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PINs because they require additional knowledge or interaction as the price for increased
security.
Alternatives to passwords and PINS
Graphical passwords [9,23], gestures and screen interaction [24-27] and biometric
authentication [28,29], among others, are emerging as viable alternatives to passwords
and PINs as smartphone authenticators. Biometrics, in particular, have seen much
research interest in terms of authentication, likely due to the range of sensors available
on modern mobile devices. Since more than one sensor is usually available, research has
focused on using the fusion of multiple biometrics to downplay any limitations that a sin-
gle biometric may have. For instance, Hazen et al. have studied a method that fuses facial
and speech recognition [30]; their results show that error rates can be reduced by up to
90% when compared to the error rates for each individual biometric. Trewin et al. com-
pared three biometric modalities (face, voice and gestures) to the use of passwords as
authenticators on mobile devices in terms of the effects of each on the time, effort, num-
ber of errors and task disruption [29]. Their study showed that the biometric modalities
facilitated speedier authentication as compared to password entry. Their results enforce
the idea that user frustration with password and PIN-based authentication on smart-
phones provides a possibility for a change in authentication modality, but that a high level
of usability must be achieved and maintained to encourage user acceptance of the new
method.
Transparent authentication
Both secret knowledge-based methods and the methods suggested to strengthen them
require the user to explicitly authenticate prior to using their device. This effortful authen-
tication is unsuited to the mobile device environment, which is characterized by a bursty
use pattern – the smartphone is used very frequently but for short periods of time [31,32].
Generally, with each new interaction the user must re-authenticate, which may become
frustrating or annoying to the device owner. The purpose of transparent authentication
is to remove the barriers often caused by security tasks – a user rarely picks up a device
with the intention of performing security measures. Instead, the user has some other task
to accomplish, and authentication is a barrier that must be overcome in order to achieve
their intended task.
Research into the area of transparent authentication has begun to gain attention as
mobile devices become increasingly ubiquitous, store increasingly private information,
and as the shortcomings of passwords and PINs on these devices becomes abundantly
clear. Hocking et al. have introduced a transparent authentication method called Authen-
tication Aura, in which the user is authenticated by polling the area around the device
to determine whether known devices associated with the owner are in close proxim-
ity [33]. Their results show that such initial polling can reduce the number of explicit
authentication requests by up to 74%, which significantly reduced user frustration with
authentication. Similarly, De Luca et al. have studied a transparent authenticationmethod
that is based on patterns in how the user interacts with the touch screen on a mobile
device [25]. Their study found that adding such a behavioral biometric to password use
increased security and made the device more resistant to attacks. Clarke et al. have per-
formed significant research into transparent authentication, both in terms of assessing
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frameworks and prototypes [34] and possible biometrics for use in transparent authenti-
cation, such as facial recognition [35] and keystroke dynamics [36]. Karatzouni et al. have
expanded upon the work of Clarke et al. to assess user opinions of both current authen-
tication methods and transparent methods [37]. They found that users envisage a need
for increased security on mobile devices due to the nature of the data kept on them, and
that biometrics and transparent authentication were feasible replacements for traditional
authentication methods. These results show that user privacy, and how they perceive
the risks to their personal information, is an important consideration in deploying a
transparent authentication method.
User privacy on smartphones
Frequent pop-ups and warnings desensitize the user to the risks they are accepting, par-
ticularly if no immediate negative consequences are seen as a result [38]. Therefore, a
warning system that uses fewer warnings may help increase security on smartphones.
Furthermore, users are confused by permission warning systems such as those used by
Android [39,40], in which the user is notified about the particular services an app wishes
to access for each app installed. Apps that provide fine-grained privacy control have been
examined and found useful in managing app permissions [41], but allowing the user to
remove Android permissions statically has been found to cause instability in app func-
tionality [42]. Centralized permission systems, such as those used by the Apple App Store
in which the app and its use are governed by a centralized body, remove the burden of
judging an app’s need for access to potentially private or sensitive information. While
this seems to be a positive benefit, it may be the case that the body making the ultimate
decision has different sensitivities regarding what is private, offensive or potentially risky.
Research has been performed to examine this gap between the user and the decision-
making body’s concerns regarding smartphone privacy and security, as summarized in
the following sections.
Smartphone user privacy concerns
Building upon research that shows privacy and security are concerns to mobile device
owners, recent work has identified some of the specific threats that concern users. Chin
et al. found that users are more concerned about privacy on their smartphones com-
pared to their laptops [43]. They report that users are significantly less willing to perform
tasks such as making purchases and accessing their bank accounts or medical records on
their mobile devices. They found no significant difference, however, when the users were
asked about sharing photos and viewing work-related email on their smartphones versus
laptops [43].
Similarly, Felt et al. surveyed 3115 smartphone users about 99 selected risks associated
with their smartphone and ranked them according to the number of users who would be
“very upset” if the risk occurred [44]. They found that the warnings presented to users
upon installing an app in both Android and iOS do not correspond to user concerns
regarding privacy and security on mobile devices.
Mobile devices, when compared to desktop and laptop computers, have been shown
to have different needs in terms of privacy and security [45]. Many smartphones have
two types of mobile device PINs [46,47]; the handset PIN, which protects the handset
itself and the data stored in its memory from unauthorized use, and the SIM PIN, which
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protects the use of, and data stored on, the SIM. Kowalski and Goldstein found that most
users did not understand the difference between (and the existence of) the SIM and hand-
set PINs [48]. They further found that only 32% of users in their study were aware of the
SIM PIN, and none of them chose to use it. Similarly, Botha et al. distinguish between
SIM and handset PINs and recognize that these are simply point-of-entry security mech-
anisms that have limited ability to provide content security [49]. They also found that PIN
entry on mobile platforms may be tedious and annoying to the owner because “mobile
users may simply wish to take the device out of their pocket to check a schedule entry
and could therefore find that entering the password takes longer than the task itself”.
([49], p.3). These findings suggest the need for a more nuanced and effortless mechanism
for mobile devices.
User opinions of transparent authentication
Biometrics are one way of providing transparent authentication. Jones et al. performed a
survey of respondents to determine what, if any, technologies were familiar and accept-
able to respondents as a potential authenticator [50]. They found that biometrics such as
fingerprints were nearly as acceptable to users as passwords (67% for fingerprints com-
pared to 70% for passwords), but that smart cards, other tokens and biometrics such as
iris and retina scans were far less acceptable (32%, 27% and 44%, respectively).
In order to determine the current (at the time) use of authentication on mobile devices,
Clarke and Furnell conducted a survey of 297 mobile device owners to determine mobile
device use frequency, the type of authentication they used, and their attitudes toward
future authentication options [46]. They found that 83% of respondents favored the
use of biometrics-based authentication. They further found that approximately 33% of
respondents did not use a password or PIN at all.
As a follow-up study, Clarke et al. performed an evaluation of a behavioral biometrics-
based transparent authentication framework called Non-Intrusive and Continuous
Authentication (NICA) [6]. Their evaluation found that 92% of the 27 participants
reported that the NICA prototype provided a more secure environment when compared
to other forms of authentication such as passwords and PINs.
Our study builds upon research in mobile authentication, behavioral biometrics and
transparent authentication by determining whether users might accept transparent
authentication on smartphones, what their attitudes are towards the use of behavioral bio-
metrics to authenticate themselves on a smartphone, and what their opinions are towards
having a more granular (rather than binary) approach to smartphone authentication and
security.
Research design andmethodology
We performed a lab-based, between-groups study ([51], p. 74) in which 30 participants
were asked to complete seven tasks using an Apple iPhone provided by the experimenter.
The seven tasks were divided into three security levels (Low,Medium, and High) that rep-
resented the level of device confidence the device must have before the task is allowed.
Device confidence is a term that defines the certainty the device has that its current user
is also the device owner. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three groups
that determined the level of transparent authentication they experienced. After the par-
ticipant completed the tasks, we asked them a series of questions in a semi-structured
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interview about their experiences with the transparent authentication mechanism, their
general impressions of, and perceived needs for, smartphone security. Figure 1 depicts the
interplay between the different aspects of the experimental setup.
Our study was designed with three main constraints in mind. First, we intended to elicit
information about the users’ opinions of the privacy and security provided by the mobile
device, rather than their opinions of the functionality of or applications on the device.
Second, because the users were given an iPhone, we made it clear that the device itself
was unimportant to their opinions and that a similar security methodmay be available for
Android or Blackberry devices. Finally, since our study did notmake use of a real transpar-
ent authentication method on the provided device, we had to be very careful to maintain
the impression that one was there, even in the face of questions from participants.
We obtained IRB permission to perform the study prior to its start. All personally iden-
tifying information was coded to protect the identity of the participant, and all interviews,
which were recorded with the participant’s permission, were deleted after transcription.
Participants
The 30 participants ranged in age from 20 to 58 years (median = 26.5, mean = 29.4). 60%
of the respondents were Android users with various handset models, 13% were iPhone
users, 10% used a Blackberry and the remaining 17% used a feature phone (e.g., non-
smart phone). 17% of the participants were female and 83% were male. Participants were
recruited in August and September 2012 using convenience sampling methods, through
a combination of email invitations and requests for participation to university classes.
Participants were not required to own or use a smartphone, and were paid an honorarium
for their time.
Figure 1 Interplay between the tasks, their security levels, the confidence level of the device and the
confidence level of the authentication mechanism.
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On their own devices, 27% of participants used a 4-digit PIN, with the same percentage
using a sketched password. 30% used no security method, and the remaining 16% used
another method, such as encryption and passwords.
Apparatus andmaterials
Participants used an Apple iPhone 4 with iOS version 5.1.1 during the experiment. It was
pre-loaded with the study application and preset with the participant’s randomly assigned
category and a starting device confidence of “Low”. This made it possible to remove
potential confounding effects of different operating system versions, and the presence of
current applications and stored data on the device. It also limited potential interference
from other applications on the participant’s own device. The experimenter recorded the
interviews using the VoiceMemo application on another iPhone. Afterwards, participants
were asked a series of questions in a semi-structured interview. The study was conducted
in an on-campusmeeting room, with one participant and one experimenter per interview;
each session lasted 60 to 90 minutes.
Methods
The study began with a short demographic-style questionnaire. The participant was then
given an introduction to transparent authentication, introduced to the Apple iPhone and
told that a transparent authentication method was running on the device. Transparent
authentication was described to the participant as a method that works in the background
and allows or disallows access to apps and services such asWiFi or 3G by using the way the
device is used to determine if the current user is the legitimate device owner. They were
told that the biometrics used were how you speak (voice) and how you type (keystroke
dynamics), and that as more and more of these were gathered, the device would become
increasingly certain as to who was using the device. Participants were also told that, due
to study constraints, no biometrics had been pre-gathered about them so the study would
start with a device confidence of Low. Finally, they were told to use a challenge question
to explicitly authenticate where they felt it was needed (i.e., if they thought it might help
them complete a task).
The participant was told how to turn off or override the transparent authentication
mechanism should they wish to at any point during the experiment. This was imple-
mented via a Settings button that popped up a view that asked the participant to confirm
that they wanted to turn off security. The transparent authentication could be turned on
via the same set of steps. The ability to turn off transparent authentication was provided
to build a mental model of the intended transparent authentication method, although the
actual working of the application depended on the category to which the participant had
been assigned. Each participant began the study with a combination of a “Low” security
level and whichever category they had been randomly allocated to.
Upon launching the study application, the participant was prompted via an alert box to
set the answer to their challenge question, as a backup to the transparent authentication
method. If a task was not allowed because device confidence was lower than the required
task confidence, the participant was notified via an alert that stated the required task con-
fidence and the current device confidence, and asked if the participant wanted to answer
their challenge question. If the participant said yes (and answered it correctly), the device
confidence was increased by one level (i.e., from Low to Medium or Medium to High).
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After providing a baseline answer to the challenge question, the participant saw the main
“Tasks” screen. All participants completed the tasks in the same order. The order of the
tasks were from low to high security, and dictated whether or not explicit authentication
was required.
Tasks
Participants completed seven tasks that were classified into one of three security levels:
Low, Medium and High based on the general level of privacy or sensitivity a particular
task warranted. The task security required a matching device confidence level for the par-
ticipant to be able to carry them out. The transparent authentication mechanism needs to
have that level of confidence that the participant is indeed the authorized device owner.
Since the experiment does not last long enough for the participant to build up a device
confidence of sufficient level, the device confidence was initially set to “Low” and the
participant was instructed to assume that it was based on previous interaction with the
device.
The tasks were chosen to represent commonly-used mobile device functionality, as well
as for their familiarity to participants. Since one of the study goals was to determine how
easy or difficult each task was for the participants, by selecting familiar tasks we hoped
that an observed increase in task difficulty could be attributed to additional steps required
by the underlying security provision. Participants were reminded that the purpose of the
study was to assess their impressions of the security features of the transparent authen-
tication method as described to them, and not their ability to achieve the tasks, nor the
user interface of the application itself.
The tasks given to each participant are detailed below.
Low security tasks
Read Document: The participant was asked to open and read the contents of an
ostensibly private document from a list. The document titles, such as “PasswordList”, “Pri-
vateThoughts” and “BankStatement”, were chosen to create a sense of privacy; while the
documents did not actually belong to the participant, they were asked to assume that they
did. This task was intended to determine whether assigning security levels by task was
a realistic way of mapping device confidence to device functionality, since we expected
that different participants would prefer to have the ability to place documents at different
security levels.
Take Photo: The participant was asked to use the mobile device to take a photo of a
diagram on a whiteboard in the study locale. Taking a photo on a device may not be a
high-security task since it is unlikely to cause the device owner undue concern since the
photos can simply be deleted. Exceptions exist, especially in cases of applications where a
photo can be immediately uploaded to social networking sites, for example. However, it is
envisaged that the ability to view photos rather than take them would fall under a higher
security level; this task was included to test this assumption.
Medium security tasks
Send Email: The participant was asked to send an email to a particular email address,
with text provided by the experimenter. The text was intended to be somewhat private to
give the participant a feeling that they would want to prevent others from seeing it. This
Crawford and Renaud Journal of Trust Management 2014, 1:7 Page 11 of 28
http://www.journaloftrustmanagement.com/content/1/1/7
task was used to provide a way for the user to type during the study in order to provide a
biometric match or non-match based on their typing pattern. No biometric classification
was actually performed; either match or non-match was randomly selected after typing.
After the task was completed, the participant was told whether their keystroke dynamics
biometric was a match or non-match and the device confidence level was adjusted up or
down accordingly.
View Photo: The participant was asked to view a photo, generally the one of the diagram
that had been taken in the “Take Photo” task. This task was intended to get the partici-
pant thinking about viewing photos versus taking photos and the security ramifications
of others viewing their (potentially private) photos.
Make Local Call: The participant was asked to dial a local phone number provided by
the experimenter and leave a message of a private nature. The financial aspect of making
a call was of interest in this task; the assumption was that a local call would have a lower
fee associated with it compared to a long distance call. This task also allowed the partic-
ipant to speak and thus (theoretically) provide a biometric sample. The participant was
informed whether their speaker verification biometric was a match or a non-match, with
the accompanying adjustment of the device confidence level.
High security tasks
Make International Call: The participant was asked to dial a long-distance telephone
number and leave a message provided by the experimenter. Dialing a long-distance call
may have a high cost associated with it compared to making a local call, which allowed us
to explore participant opinions on financial risks. This task also allowed another speaker
verification match or non-match, much like as described for the Make Local Call task.
Change Device PIN: The participant was asked to change the device PIN. This task was
included to assess how participants perceive the value of the PIN mechanism and the
security it provides.
Each participant was allocated randomly to one of three categories, which affected their
ability to complete the tasks. The participant was able to perform the tasks firstly based on
the current device confidence and secondly on their pre-set category, as described below:
None: Participants were unable to complete any task, regardless of their current device
confidence. This category is intended to assess the level of frustration seen in a seemingly
broken authentication method – one that prevents task completion. This category tested
whether the participant would choose to turn off or override the mechanism in frustra-
tion. This level of authentication mimics the first stages of using a transparent method,
when the device owner has not yet provided sufficient biometric samples to create a
baseline for future comparison.
All: Participants were able to complete all on-device tasks regardless of device confi-
dence. This category tested whether the participant becomes distrustful of the security
provided, since they are neither challenged nor denied access to data or device function-
ality. This level is meant to mimic the situation in which the mobile device user suspects
the security method is malfunctioning and allowing full access to all users.
Some: Participants were able to complete the tasks that were at their current or lower
device confidence only. As such, the application compared the current device confi-
dence to that of their current task, and allowed access if the task level was lower than
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or equal to the current device confidence. The participant could raise the device confi-
dence by answering their challenge question or by having amatching keystroke or speaker
biometric result. This category mimics the real design and use of a transparent authen-
tication method, where the current device confidence is matched to a pre-chosen task
authentication level.
The participants were asked to attempt all tasks on the device via the custom designed
application and in the same order. Observations were recorded throughout. In particular,
the number of times the challenge question was used per task was recorded, as was the
number of times the transparent authentication method was deactivated. These values
were expected to vary depending on category. Those in the “All” category, for instance,
should not have needed to turn off security or answer the challenge question. The par-
ticipants in the “None” category, however, may have overridden the mechanism by using
the challenge question several times before turning off the mechanism altogether. Once
the participants had completed all tasks, they were asked a series of questions about
their experience in a semi-structured interview (see Appendix A for interview questions).
Interview questions explored candidate attitudes towards mobile phone security in gen-
eral and attempted to gauge initial impressions about the acceptability of a transparent
authentication mechanism controlling access on a mobile device.
The participants were debriefed after the interview: they were told that no transpar-
ent authentication mechanism had actually been running on the device and that none
of their details had actually been collected. They were informed of the three participant
categories, and to which category they had been allocated.
Analysis
The independent variable for this study is the level of transparent authentication the user
sees: a high level (the “None” category), a moderate level (the “Some” category) or a low
level (the “All” category). The dependent variables were their subjective perceptions of
transparent authentication and their subjective beliefs about the security level provided by
a transparent authentication method. These were measured using ordinal-answer ques-
tions (i.e., Likert scale questions) as well as a semi-structured interview. The recordings
were transcribed for analysis purposes. We thus had three kinds of data to inform our
analysis:
1. Transcribed interviews;
2. Data recorded by the application about what the participants actually did; and
3. Demographic data from the applicants.
We analyzed the data quantitatively and qualitatively. The demographic and descriptive
data was charted and analyzed in order to ensure that we understood what the par-
ticipants did during the experiment. The interview transcripts were analysed using the
Grounded Theory approach ([52], p. 101) to elicit themes in the answers. We worked first
through the transcripts of the interviews line by line, coding the data. This process was
repeated to ensure that all codes had been identified. The codes were then grouped into
themes.
Statistical significance of the ordinal data was determined initially using the Kruskal-
Wallis test. This test was chosen for its applicability to non-parametric data with three or
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more independent participant categories. In cases where the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated
statistical significance, the inter-category significance was tested in a pairwise manner
using the Mann-Whitney test, which is suitable for use on non-parametric data where
there are two independent groups.
Results
No participants withdrew, and each participant was paid £6 for their time. The final
themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis are discussed below.
The first theme, basis for security level choice, provides an insight into user percep-
tions when choosing security levels. The second theme, security as a barrier, answers the
questions about the helpful nature of removing security barriers, and whether they use or
override transparent authentication and why. Questions regarding perceived security are
answered by the final theme, user perceptions of authentication.
Theme 1: basis for security level choice
Participants expressed concerns regarding data and functionality on current mobile
devices, and expressed the desire to protect them. One reason given for not using an
access control mechanism on their own devices was the inconvenience of having repeat-
edly to enter a password or PIN. This confirms the arguments of [31,32] about the impact
of the bursty usage pattern on the inconvenience imposed by current access control
mechanisms that require authentication at each use.
Figure 2 depicts the participant responses for the required security confidence level for
each experimental task, grouped into High, Medium and Low as an aggregate of the three
participant categories.
All participants, regardless of category, considered “Change Device PIN” a high security
task. This result indicates that changing PINs was considered a “meta-security” task, in
that use of a PIN controls access to device data, functionality and settings as well as pro-
viding point-of-entry access control. Some participants noted that control over the device
and its functionality belongs to the person who knows the PIN. One participant referred
































































Figure 2 Participant choices for task security level.
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Participants did not consider the “Take a Photo” task to be high security. Taking a
photo adds data to the device rather than editing or exposing existing data, and is easily
deleted by the device owner. Therefore, this task is not a source of data leakage or privacy
concerns to the participants in our study.
The “Read Document” task had a relatively even split between high, medium, and low
security. This shows the link between the contents or subject of the document and the
preferred level of security. Participants preferred to have the ability to assign a more fine-
grained security level based on the sensitivity of each document’s contents, rather than
based on the meta-task.When they were required to choose an overall level, many partic-
ipants chose the higher security level with the intention of better protecting any private
or sensitive information that might reside in one of the documents. A clear distinction
was made between personal and business-related documents: the former were referred to
using the terms “personal” or “private”, which denote a sense of ownership. Work-related
documents, on the other hand, were referred to as “sensitive” and “dangerous”, which
imply that the participant understood that there was some risk associated with their being
exposed, but this does not suggest a sense of ownership.
The differences between the preferred security levels per task reveal a number of con-
siderations that participants implicitly took into account to determine the sensitivity of a
given task. Some major themes emerged during the analysis of the responses. When par-
ticipants were asked why they chose a particular security level for the task in question,
responses fell into one of the following categories.
Perceived risks
The study participants cited the following risks that affected the levels to which they
allocated the tasks:
Data Loss or Exposure: This risk is strongly linked to data ownership. For example,
participants drew a clear distinction between loss of personal data as opposed to work–
related data. Loss of personal data, they considered, implied loss of reputation or “face”
that could be difficult to overcome in the device owner’s social circles. Loss of business
data, on the other hand, could result in loss of a job and professional reputation.
Impersonation: The risk of impersonation was a strong theme, particularly with respect
to sending email. The anticipated severity ranged from pranks by friends who may send
a false email to a mutual friend, to more serious examples that included sending negative
or derogatory email to the owner’s boss, or using the owner’s email as a way of “doing evil
things” or committing fraud.
Financial Loss: This risk was prevalent when discussing making telephone calls, both
international and local. The perceived risk of financial loss was directly proportional to
the chosen security level. For instance, international calls were consideredmore expensive
than local calls, and thus were assigned a higher security level. Thus, associating financial
loss with a particular task makes it more likely that device owners would be prepared to
perform specific actions in order to protect the data or to authorise the task.
Embarrassment (Misinterpretation of Actions): Strongly related to impersonation
and loss of reputation, embarrassment was a risk factor that was associated with many
of the tasks. Participants were particularly concerned with embarrassing or compromis-
ing photos and other images, as opposed to emails, text messages, or documents. The
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embarrassment risk was not in the subject of the photo itself, but with the risk that others
may see it, or perhaps pass it onto mutual friends via email or MMS.
Identity Theft and Fraud: Identity theft differs from impersonation in that the latter is
single instance and ID theft encompasses multiple instances and has much more serious
consequences due to the importance of identity in transactions such as banking.
Damage control after data compromise: Once a person’s identity is stolen, it can take a
significant amount of time to reclaim the identity and to rebuild reputation and credibility
including aspects such as credit ratings and credit card ownership. In less far-reaching sit-
uations, there is an aspect of damage control linked to the embarrassment and reputation
risks, since time and effort must go into rebuilding status in both social and professional
spheres.
Access to some data or tasks may imply access to others: Coupling of tasks and data
access is common onmobile devices. For instance, access to email probably permits access
to the device owner’s address book. It was unclear to many study participants whether
protecting one task implied protection of all associated tasks or data, so they tended to
assign a higher required security level in these cases.
Data/task sensitivity
If a task or data were considered sensitive, personal or private, the participants in all three
categories felt that the device confidence level required to access the task or data should
be higher than that of a non-sensitive task or data. This expressed desire to protect them-
selves is understandable, yet we found that many of the participants did not consider their
own on-device data either important or sensitive. Many expressed the belief that there
was little data of value on their device. They were also generally uninformed about how
much data their own device actually held at the time of the experiment.
Control over device & data
Device owners expressed a strong need to control physical access to their own device and
the data it contained. Some participants achieved this simply by keeping the device on
their person all the time.
“. . . it never really leaves my pocket . . . ”
Techniques such as supervision and physical possession of the device were used to ease
security concerns. Device sharing was cited as a motivation for assigning security lev-
els according to perceived data sensitivity. Participants stated that implementing public
and private folders or memory locations would allow them to share their device with-
out risking sensitive data exposure. Such sharing was done in a very controlled fashion:
participants supervised device use and considered this non-negotiable.
The sense of control over the device and data extended to the choice of security mech-
anism. When asked whether they would consider using a transparent authentication
method on their own mobile device, 90% of the participants answered in the affirma-
tive, at least on a trial basis. The participants stated that they would “play around with”
the method to “see how it worked”. Such a statement shows the owner’s desire to know
how the security provisions work, and this applies equally to a transparent method. They
clearly wanted to have control over its operation and access to data. Furthermore, our
interpretation suggested that they might well also want to understand how intrusive
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the security provision will be before committing to its use. Reasons advanced for why
they would subsequently remove such a transparent authentication mechanism included
annoyance, too-frequent explicit authentication requests, or if they believed the method
was not restricting access with sufficiently rigour: “allowed anybody to access my stuff”.
Interestingly, many participants stated that their feeling of device and data security was
enhanced by barriers existing to control data access, even though some considered such
barriers annoying and frustrating.
One participant suggested that since biometric usage data was already on the device, it
would be a positive benefit to the device owner to have this data used to enhance security
provision:
“In the past people might have raised concerns about storing that kind of information
[keystrokes and voice] on a mobile device, but ...if it’s already on there, why not use
it to provide additional security? It’s practically already recording your voice, and it’s
already recording what you’re typing and things like that, so, I’m not sure the objection
of storing that information on a mobile device is valid.”
Theme 2: security as a barrier
There was a clear theme of security being a barrier, or hurdle, that emerged from the
analysis. Participants seemed somewhat conflicted about this. On the one hand the per-
ceived access control delivered by said barrier gave them a sense of security. On the
other hand, these barriers sometimes prevented them from accessing their own data and
device functionality. Many stated that they would remove access control software if it got
“too annoying”, or required them to explicitly authenticate too often, something that they
considered would be “frustrating”.
The “Some” category had a large number of explicit authentication requests, as shown
in Figure 3. This stands to reason since this category had the least access to tasks out of all
categories when transparent authentication was enabled. The “None” category also had
a large number of explicit authentication uses because they too saw its use as a means of
accomplishing their task. It was expected that they would quickly learn that using explicit
authentication did not allow them to complete the tasks. This assumption held for all
but one participant, who felt that repeatedly entering the challenge question was pro-
































































Figure 3 Per-task frequency of explicit authentication use for each of the seven tasks, divided by
participant category.
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the “Some” and “None” groups and supporting comments show that the device owner’s
threshold for interruption is relatively low. They also reinforce the “security as a barrier”
mental model, and confirm that their usual tasks are the main goal when using a mobile
device.
To determine the effect of barriers on security provision, the participants in all cat-
egories were able to disable transparent authentication. Figure 4 shows the frequency
with which participants disabled transparent authentication on a per-task basis. The
“Some” category participants did not disable transparent authentication at all. Their men-
tal model matched the actual operation of transparent authentication; therefore they were
able to complete all tasks using explicit authentication and biometric matches only. The
“All” category members chose to disable transparent authentication before the tasks that
required higher device confidence. The “None” category disabled transparent authentica-
tion frequently for the first task, and increasingly less with subsequent tasks. Participants
in the “None” group chose to disable transparent authentication permanently early in the
experiment, which suggests that task completion might well trump precaution, especially
when security becomes intrusive and overly arduous.
The theme of security as a barrier is strongly supported by the behavioral recording
data. Explicit authentication requests force the user to stop the task they intend to com-
plete and resume it once authentication is complete. The perceived level of frustration
with such interruptions was cited as a major reason that participants in this study would
consider disabling a transparent authentication method on their device.
One of the main reasons for the amount of frustration felt when security provision
was seen as a barrier was lack of access to the data on the device. Figure 5 shows the
participants’ perceived levels of data protection provided by transparent authentication,
per category. Participants in the “All” category thought the data was poorly protected
since they indicated an answer higher than neutral in only two cases. This category
had the fewest security barriers with which to contend. Conversely, many of the “None”
category members, who had the most security barriers, considered the data very or some-
what well protected. The “Some” category members ranged somewhere between the “All”
and “None” extremes. They had a moderate number of security barriers, and largely
































































Figure 4 Per-task frequency of disabling transparent authentication for each of the seven tasks by
participant category.
































Figure 5 Perceptions of data protection provided by transparent authentication. Each category had
10 participants; some declined to provide a specific value, as shown by the shorter bars.
Theme 3: perceptions of authentication
The participants seemed to believe that “something is better than nothing” in terms of
security provision. This, however, does not explain the actions of those participants who
chose to use no security at all on their own device. Other things, perhaps the barriers pro-
vided by explicit authentication methods, discourage them from using security on their
devices even though they seem to believe that it is useful. This theme can also be seen in
the previously stated opinions on PIN use. Participants saw the PIN as a powerful over-
arching security method for protecting the functionality and data on their own device. It
seemed, however, that the other side of the coin, not being able to access their own data,
outweighed the need for this barrier being put in the way of potential thieves. The barrier
was too uni-dimensional: it offered the same obstacle to intruder and legitimate user.
When they had expressed their opinion of their own device’s access control offerings,
including whether they used it or not, we asked them directly about whether they thought
transparent authentication would be an attractive alternative. Figures 6 and 7 show partic-
ipant opinions on transparent authentication provision compared to either their current
mobile device security method (Figure 6) or to no security at all (Figure 7). These figures
show that the majority of participants felt that the security provided by transparent
authentication was at least as good as what they currently use on their own device, and
much better than no security at all. This feeling of a secure environment may encourage
users to adopt transparent authentication as an alternative to traditional passwords and
PINs.
The overwhelming majority of the participants would consider using a transparent
authentication method. However, the participants offered several areas of improvement
for transparent authentication, as follows:
1. Assign required device confidence on a per-task or per-folder basis, in addition to
by task or application. Have pre-set values that can be changed by owner to reduce
initial setup effort.
2. Minimize the number of explicit authentication interruptions as much as possible
as these are considered frustrating and intrusive.



























A Lot Less Secure
Figure 6 Security provision of transparent authentication compared to owner’s current method.
Each category had 10 participants; some declined to provide a specific value, as shown by the shorter bars.
3. Keep the owner’s data on the owner’s device. Do not share it with others, or
remove it from the device in order to implement a security mechanism.
4. Minimize effort for frequent tasks. This can be managed by allowing the device
owner to select a lower device confidence for tasks that are accessed frequently.
Quantitative analysis
We analysed the information gathered by the application itself while the participants used
it, in order to determine whether there were differences between the different experi-
mental groups. Table 1 shows the frequency of explicit authentication use per task; the
majority of explicit authentication use occurred from participants in the “Some” and
“None” groups. This is an expected result since they were the groups that experienced
the most barriers when attempting to complete tasks. It can be argued that the “Some”


























A Lot Less Secure
Figure 7 Security provision of transparent authentication compared to no security. Each category had
10 participants; some declined to provide a specific value, as shown by the shorter bars.
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Table 1 Total number of explicit authentication attempts per experimental group (All,





Read document 0 0 16 < 0.0001
Take photo 0 1 8 0.0436
Send email 0 10 23 0.0008
View photo 5 10 17 0.1290
Make local call 1 0 1 0.5958
Change device PIN 2 10 1 0.0009
Make international call 5 19 5 < 0.0001
Totals 13 50 71
Median 1 10 8
Mode 0 10 1
Std. Dev. 2.27 7.13 8.61
The last column shows statistical significance calculated using the Kruskal-Wallis test. ρ < 0.05 are significant (bolded values).
participants to complete their tasks, where the use in the “None” group was not rein-
forced by being able to then complete the task. Table 1 shows that the “None” group
(71 instances, median = 8, mode = 1, SD = 8.61) actually had more instances of explicit
authentication use than the “Some” group (50 instances, median = 10, mode = 10, SD =
7.13). However, this result is affected by the contribution of one study participant who
misunderstood the function of the challenge question. During the semi-structured inter-
view, the participant stated that they chose to enter their answer repeatedly because they
thought that their typing biometrics were being sampled and that task access would be
granted when the mechanism had “enough” biometric information. This had the result
of artificially increasing the total number of explicit authentication requests seen for
the “None” group. This participant’s data is included in this analysis rather than being
removed as an outlier because the data the participant contributed in other parts of the
study (frequency of turning off transparent authentication, qualitative answers to semi-
structured interview questions) showed no such bias, and were valuable in assessing other
aspects of the hypotheses that drove this work.
There were significant differences in the frequency of explicit authentication use in all
tasks except View Photo andMake Local Call (see Table 1). The order of the tasks had an
effect on these values, since all participants began the study at a Low device confidence,
and thus had access to at least the first two tasks as they were Low security. The exception
is the “None” category, since they were unable to complete any tasks while the transparent
authentication was in operation. The significance in explicit authentication frequency per
task can be interpreted as the number of barriers presented to participants in various
categories; the “All” category had no barriers at all, the “Some” category had a moderate
number, and the “None” category had a large number. It is interesting to note that some
participants in the “All” category decided to use the explicit authentication despite having
task access without it. This shows that they had a strong mental model of the transparent
authentication mechanism, and attempted to work within it.
To determine which categories contained the significant results for frequency of using
explicit authentication, pairwise comparisons between the frequency data for the “All”,
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“Some”, and “None” categories were performed using the Mann-Whitney test, as shown
in Table 2. The View Photo and Make Local Call tasks have been excluded from Table 2
because there was no indication of statistical significance revealed by the Kruskal-Wallis
tests.
Per Table 2, most of the categories were significantly different from each of the other
categories in terms of the number of times explicit authentication was used per task
(see Table 1 for the per-task frequencies). The exceptions are when comparing “All” and
“None” for the Change PIN andMake International Call tasks, and “All” and “Some” and
“Some” and “None” for the Take Photo task. These differences show that barriers pre-
sented before allowing tasks were significantly more frequent for “Some” and “All”. This
represents a potentially annoying amount of intrusion into the participants’ attempts to
complete the assigned tasks, a notion that was supported in the participants’ comments.
The total number of times a participant chose to turn off transparent authentication
is depicted in Table 3. As is expected, due to the barriers put in place for the “None”
group, they had the highest instance of disabling transparent authentication. Thus, task
completion was considered more important, at least in the experimental setting, than the
security of the device and its data.
Perceiving tasks as the main goal is supported by the significant differences between
the “None” and “All” and “None” and “Some” categories for the tasks in Table 4. In both
cases, many participants in the “All” category did not feel the need to disable transparent
authentication since all tasks were accessible with it enabled. In the “None” category, the
only way to complete the tasks was to disable transparent authentication, so the difference
between these occurrences is understood. Similarly, there would also be many instances
in the “Some” category where disabling transparent authentication aided the participant
in completing tasks, therefore explaining the statistically significant differences between
Table 2 Pairwise ρ values calculated using theMann-Whitney test for number of times





All – NaN < 0.0008
Some – – < 0.0008
None – – –
Take photo
All – 0.3681 0.0347
Some – – 0.1224
None – – –
Send email
All – < 0.00002 0.0147
Some – – 0.7066
None – – –
Change PIN
All – < 0.0005 0.5828
Some – – < 0.00008
None – – –
Make international call
All – 0.0012 1.000
Some – – 0.0012
None – – –
ρ < 0.05 are significant (bolded values). The comparison between the “All” and “Some” categories for the Read Document
task is NaN because there were no occurrences of explicit authentication for either category.
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Read document 0 0 9 < 0.0001
Take photo 0 0 5 0.0030
Send email 2 0 7 0.0025
View photo 1 0 5 0.0146
Make local call 0 0 2 0.1260
Change device PIN 0 0 1 0.3679
Make international call 1 0 4 0.0490
Totals 4 0 33
Median 0 0 5
Mode 0 0 5
Std. Dev. 0.79 0 2.75
The last column shows statistical significance calculated using the Kruskal-Wallis test. ρ < 0.05 are significant (bolded values).
these occurrences and the “None” category. These results reinforced the finding that dis-
abling transparent authentication, and leaving it off for subsequent tasks, was considered
the correct course of action, and that completing the tasks was more important than
protecting the information and accessibility of tasks on the device.
Study limitations
The convenience sampling methods used represent a potential source of study bias since
the participants were skewed towards technically-minded males that were younger than
an unbiased distribution. However, the age of the participants is in-line with the average
Table 4 Pairwise ρ values calculated using theMann-Whitney test for frequency that





All – NaN < 0.0001
Some – – < 0.0001
None – – –
Take photo
All – NaN 0.0137
Some – – 0.0137
None – – –
Send email
All – 0.1675 0.0318
Some – – 0.0016
None – – –
View photo
All – 0.3681 0.0636
Some – – 0.0137
None – – –
Make international call
All – 0.3681 0.1444
Some – – 0.0336
None – – –
ρ < 0.05 are significant. The two NaN values mark cases where both categories had no instances of turning off security.
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age of UKmobile device owners [53]. Since this study is introductory in nature, this source
of bias can be considered acceptable.
The majority of the data gathered in this study is of a subjective nature; it is the partic-
ipants’ opinions and perceptions and is thus subject to their own beliefs and knowledge.
The same study conducted on a larger or differently populated group (as the group sam-
pled here was UK-centric) could well result in a different range of opinions. Asking
participants to express opinions is a widely-used mechanism for gauging mental models
of particular concepts and, as such, was warranted here. The UK-centric nature of the
participants clearly signals the need for a wider ranging study but does not detract from
the value of the insights we gained from this study.
Discussion
It is curious that participants, in general, did not feel their data was valuable, were not
entirely sure how much data they held, yet were concerned about other people access-
ing this data. Their expressed preference might be a manifestation of their fear of the
unknown [54], a vague sense of being at risk and needing to take action to prevent harm.
Perhaps their behavior is rooted in loss aversion, and is not really linked to the actual value
of their data. On the other hand, it might be that participants were giving the answers
that they think the experimenter might want to hear by claiming that security barriers are
desirable, since they were aware of her research speciality.
As imperfect as our findings may be, they do, nevertheless, deliver valuable insights
into participants’ thought processes. Device owners clearly have a sense of identity asso-
ciated with their mobile devices, as demonstrated by their unwillingness to allow others
to use their devices. That they are frustrated with frequent authentication attempts is also
clear. Even if they were demonstrating a social desirability response by claiming a need for
authentication their own annoyance with it came across very clearly. Rather than merely
being lazy, it became clear that users had very good reasons for their so-called “insecure”
behaviors. Security researchers need to consider such rationales when designing security
mechanisms, or these will be subverted or discarded if they become too arduous to use.
The participants in this study were open to the idea of an alternative mechanism, espe-
cially if such a mechanism intruded as little as possible, yet at the same time did provide
a measure of protection. However, the sense of identity they associate with their devices
means that an transparent mechanism is going to have to treat the behavioral biometric
data with respect, and not remove it from the device.
Our main findings are as follows:
Security Barriers Need to be Visible: While removing security barriers such as effort-
ful authentication and warning messages may simplify security provision while limiting
user frustration with barrier frequency, this study has shown that removing all barriers is
probably unwise. Participants indicated that having a few barriers was desirable to show
that the security mechanism is working as intended. Barriers also help users build a men-
tal model of the security provided, andmay help build user trust that their data and device
are adequately protected. To our knowledge, this result is novel.
Secret Knowledge is Problematic: We found that users were fearful of forgetting secret
knowledge such as PINs and passwords because they linked that knowledge to the ability
to use their device at will. Removing the dependence on remembering a secret, while still
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adequately protecting the device functionality and data, may help relieve the user of this
fear. This result goes beyond other research that states that users do forget passwords and
PINs [55] to state that users are fearful of forgetting, and thus allow this fear to inform
their security provision on their mobile device. We also believe this result is in line with
other studies that state the user does not wish to act in an insecure manner, but perhaps
chooses to do so to make up for failings in the security provisions afforded them [3].
Biometrics are Acceptable: We found that users were willing to try transparent meth-
ods based on biometrics, although they wished to have a period of evaluation before
making a final decision. This result is similar to those found by Clarke et al. [46], and show
that a plausible authentication solution that uses biometrics and is also acceptable to users
has not yet been discovered. Furthermore, we found that users are willing to consider try-
ing transparent authentication, as they see a need for alternatives to passwords and PINs.
This finding supports similar results reported by Clarke et al. in their evaluation of the
NICA method [6].
Recommendations
Based on these findings, we recommend the following considerations for those providing
an alternative mobile device authentication mechanism:
Use what we have: Mobile devices gather a significant amount of potentially private
information about the user and their preferences, such as typing patterns, speech,
accelerometer and gyroscope data and to whom andwhen they call or text. Future authen-
tication methods can use this information as a way of determining who is using the device
at a given time via behavioral biometrics such as keystroke dynamics, speaker verification
and device use patterns. Since this information is already gathered, users tend to support
its use as a potential authenticator.
Respect the mobile device environment: Since mobile devices are characterized by a
bursty use pattern in which users access them frequently for short periods of time [31,32]
authentication methods should not represent a barrier with each use or it may encour-
age users to not use security provisions. Mobile devices also have limitations in processor
speed and memory, which is one reason for use of easy authentication methods. Alterna-
tives to these easy methods should work in the background, but not overtax processors
and memory.
Keep data on-device: Participants reported that they were uncomfortable with
personally-identifying information leaving their device. Since this data is already gath-
ered, future authentication methods that use it should process it on the device itself. This
has far-reaching privacy implications since the data remains under its owner’s control at
all times.
Removemost barriers, but not all: Our study has shown that participants choose not
to use provided security methods on their mobile device because they quickly become
frustrated with entering authentication details repeatedly. Such barriers to task com-
pletion are common in security. Since the mobile device environment is characterized
by frequent use, owners are asked to authenticate frequently. Removing some of these
barriers may help reduce user frustration with authentication, but removing all barri-
ers may have the effect of changing the user’s mental model of the security provided.
Participants opined that they would like to test, or experiment with, any new method
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before adopting it; this supports the creation of a mental model of security. There-
fore, we should give clear signals as to the current state of security on the device, and
give feedback in a non-intrusive manner as to the success or failure of authentication
methods.
Conclusions and future work
Mobile devices represent a unique environment that is not well-suited to repeated entry
of secret knowledge-based authentication methods. Consequently, we require alternative
authenticationmethods that respect both the bursty nature of this environment, as well as
the device owner’s need for a reliable, non-intrusive authentication method. Respecting
both the needs of the user and the limitations of the mobile device environment may lead
to methods that are both more usable and more acceptable to device owners.
As a first step towards realizing transparent authentication on mobile devices, we con-
ducted a user study with 30 participants to understand their opinions of transparent
mobile device authentication that is based on behavioral biometrics. Our results show
that 30% of participants used no security method on their mobile device, despite the opin-
ion that their device stored sensitive information that should be protected. Overall, 73% of
study participants felt transparent authentication was more secure than traditional meth-
ods such as secret knowledge techniques, although many of them wished to test the new
system first before making a final decision on its security provision. Finally, 90% of par-
ticipants stated that they would consider using a transparent authentication method on
their own mobile device, should one be made available to them.
Through our qualitative analysis of interview questions, we found that participants
are fearful and distrustful of PINs and other secret knowledge methods, that they often
depend on physical proximity to the device to limit unauthorized access, and that having
a few barriers helps them feel that themechanism is working as designed.We recommend
that future work in creating alternative authenticationmethods for mobile devices respect
the limitations of the mobile device environment while limiting the effort that a user must
make in order to protect their device. Furthermore, we recommend that any method be
completely transparent to the user in its workings while providing a clear indication of the
current security state of their device at any given time. Finally, we recommend that new
authentication methods keep the user’s personally identifying information on the device;
this respects the owner’s privacy and ensures that the authenticationmechanism does not
empower identity thieves.
Future work
The study reported here has several interesting avenues for future work, as follows:
• Perform a related study on tablets to see whether users express the same concerns on
more powerful and functional (but still portable) devices;
• Examine whether putting apps into particular user-chosen security levels reduces the
amount of access an application has to potentially private data/functionality. This
study examined the feelings of users to other people having access to functionality on
their device. The difference is that apps may also have that functionality and data
access. Can we also protect the user from automated data access, access to device
functionality that they have accepted due to blanket acceptance of warning messages?
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Appendix A: interview questions
• Were you able to complete all the tasks given to you? Why or why not?
• Did you turn off the transparent authentication system? Why or why not?
• Did you use the challenge question feature? Why or why not?
• Assume for a moment that you were placing each task from the study into a security
level that you think is most appropriate given how you use your mobile device and
how sensitive you think each task is. Use the 3-point Likert scale to assign each task
from the study into what level you think it should be in.
• How many security level choices would you like to have? Is Low/Med/High accurate
enough, or should there be more choices?
• What did you like about using the transparent authentication system?
• What did you dislike about using the transparent authentication system?
• Would you use a transparent authentication method on your own mobile device?
Why or why not?
• Using the 5-point Likert scale, indicate how well protected you thought the data on
the device was. 1 is very unprotected, 2 is somewhat unprotected, 3 is neither
protected nor unprotected, 4 is somewhat protected and 5 is very protected. Why did
you select this level?
• What security mechanism do you currently use on your mobile device?
• When compared to using your usual security mechanism as the sole security method
on a mobile device, did you feel that using a transparent authentication method was
more secure, less secure, or about the same? Use the Likert scale for this 1 is a lot less
secure, 2 is somewhat less secure, 3 is about the same, 4 is somewhat more secure,
and 5 is a lot more secure. Why?
• When compared to using no security method at all on a mobile device, did you feel
that using a transparent authentication method was more secure, less secure, or about
the same? Use the Likert scale for this 1 is a lot less secure, 2 is somewhat less secure,
3 is about the same, 4 is somewhat more secure, and 5 is a lot more secure. Why?
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